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Philip Hamburger, Law and Judicial Duty, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard
University Press, 2008. Pp. 704. $49.95(ISBN 978-0-674-03131-9).
doi: IO.IO17/S0738248010000477
Philip Hamburger's Law and Judicial Duty is a magnificent book, comprehen
sively researched and beautifully argued. In truth, it is difficult to do it justice
in a short review, but let me attempt briefly to summarize its argument, necess
arily omitting much of its nuance and detail, before going on to state my
reservations.
The nub of Hamburger's argument is that American judicial review did not
represent a significant constitutional innovation when American judges in a
number of states first began to engage in the practice during the 1780s, in
spite of the fact that in neither England nor America had there been a judicial
doctrine or practice quite like it before. In Hamburger's telling, when these
state judges began to declare acts of their legislatures unconstitutional and
null and void, they were doing no more than acting upon a centuries-old
common-law ideal ofjudicial duty. Hamburger demonstrates in amazing detail
that English judges had long considered themselves bound by a sacred oath of
office to decide disputes brought before them "according to the law of the
land." He contends that constitutions, even the customary English
Constitution, had long been viewed as part of the "law of the land"-indeed,
a part of "the law of the land" superior to every other. In deciding cases,
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moreover, judges were routinely confronted with conflicting rules of law.
When two statutes conflicted with one another, for example, or the common

law with a statute, judges were regularly forced to decide which of these
"laws of the land" should determine the outcome of the case, and as part of
their duty had developed rules to guide their judgment in such situations. A
later statute, for example, should ordinarily be preferred to an earlier one
because it represented the more recent will of the legislature. When it came
to conflicts between constitutions and statutes, the duty of the judge was to
prefer the superior law (constitution) to the inferior one (statute) in rendering

a decision "according to the law of the land." Hence, Hamburger insists,
American judicial review did not represent a great leap in the common-law tra
dition; indeed, we should not think of it as a separate development at all, but
merely an expression of the traditional common-law ideal of judicial duty in an
altered constitutional context. More on this altered constitutional context later.
In making this argument for continuity, Hamburger is forced to confront

one significant problem. Common-law tradition had long barred English
judges from declaring acts of Parliament null and void. Indeed, no English
judge ever had declared an act of Parliament null and void by judicial review.
This is not to say that judicial review was unknown in England. On the con
trary, a well-established tradition empowered English common-law judges (as
part of their duty) to declare the bylaws of municipalities and other corporate
entities null and void in so far as their enactments exceeded the legislative
powers granted to them in their charters, or otherwise conflicted with the
law of the land. The King's Privy Council, on occasion, had exercised a simi
lar power to declare statutes null and void in the course of reviewing cases

appealed from American colonial courts. Today, it is commonly thought
that this English tradition of judicial review rested principally on the idea
that a superior jurisdiction (and its courts) enjoyed the power to strike down
laws enacted by the limited and dependent jurisdictions that were politically
subordinate to it. Another way of putting the matter is to say that while the
English had developed a clear theory of "vertical" review, it is not at all appar
ent that they had developed a doctrine or practice of "horizontal" review. And
given the principal rationale for "vertical" review, the development of "hori
zontal" review would have been no simple matter, for it posed deep and pro

found constitutional issues. If the common-law courts had possessed the
authority to strike down acts of Parliament, they would, in effect, have been

exercising a jurisdiction "superior" to Parliament's?they, rather than
Parliament, would have wielded the final, unappealable judgment on what
the law of the land was to be. But it was precisely this kind of unprecedented
"horizontal" review in which American state court judges began to engage in

the 1780s.

Hamburger is fully aware of this problem and presents a great deal of evi
dence to establish two principal points. The first is that English judges had in
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fact engaged in "horizontal" review. They had decided a number of cases hold
ing that the monarch's prerogative power was limited by boundaries estab
lished by the English Constitution. Judicial duty had certainly extended to
"horizontal" review in this domain. Hamburger's second point is even more
crucial to his enterprise. He seeks to limit to its facts the common law tradition
that precluded English judges from reviewing parliamentary statutes. He con

tends that this doctrine rested entirely on two peculiar characteristics of
English constitutional life. The first was that the English Constitution was cus
tomary (although certain written documents had been incorporated into it) and
given its customary nature "Parliament was the court in which the entire realm
was presumed to be present to declare or alter their custom" (238). But I take it
the more important reason that Parliament's acts were final was that Parliament
served as the highest court in the land; no appeal from its decisions could be
taken to an inferior court. There could be no "horizontal" judicial review of

parliament's acts because those acts "explained" the constitution, and were
the final, unappealable judgments of the highest court in the realm.
In America by contrast, Hamburger argues, these two peculiarities of the

English constitutional system were absent. Americans had adopted express
constitutions during the Revolution, and had in most states made supreme
courts (rather than legislative bodies) courts of final appeal. Under these differ
ent constitutional circumstances the traditional common-law ideal of judicial

duty?to decide "according to the law of the land"?led naturally and unpro
blematically to what we call judicial review.
My allotted space is limited, but let me attempt to state a few of my reser
vations about Hamburger's argument. The first is technical but important.
Hamburger tells us that one significant way in which American legislatures
differed from Parliament was that "American legislatures were not high courts,
to which judges had to defer, and one way this became evident was through
the differentiation of judicial and legislative courts" (400). What Hamburger
fails to tell us is that Parliament itself had undergone a centuries-long devel
opment. By the eighteenth century, the judicial and legislative functions of

Parliament had largely been separated. Strictly speaking, only the upper
house of Parliament, the House of Lords, still operated as a "judicial court,"
the highest court in the realm. But Parliament as a whole, as a consequence,

had now evolved into what Hamburger calls a "legislative court," on the
face of it not so different from the way he describes the status of American

legislatures. Indeed, in several states?New York, Connecticut, and New
Jersey?the similarities between the English and American systems were
even closer. For decades after the Revolution in these states, the elected
upper house of the legislature also sat as part of the highest "judicial court"

of the state, from which no appeal could be taken. When acting together
with the lower house, these upper houses also functioned as part of the "leg
islative court" of the state, operating almost exactly in the way Parliament did.
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In New Jersey, the "judicial court" of"last resort in all causes oflaw" was "the
Court ofAppeals" composed of"the Governor and Council" (the Council also
functioned as the upper house ofthe legislature). But despite these close simi
larities, New Jersey's supreme court judges, unlike their English common-law
counterparts, apparently did not believe themselves constrained to defer to the
judgments ofa body to which their own decisions could be appealed, declaring
unconstitutional the judgment of their legislature, in which both houses had
concurred, as early as 1780 (Holmes v. Walton).
But there is a more serious problem with Hamburger's account, I think. It
leaves out constitutional politics almost entirely. The judges may well have
believed it to be their duty to strike down laws that were in conflict with
express constitutions. These constitutions, however, had been established by
the people and purported to express the people's de nova judgment about
how they wished their governments to be organized and operated. Written con
stitutions were an entirely novel form, part social contract part fundamental
law. One would think that the question of how written constitutions were to
be enforced would also be entirely new and one that had to be answered
politically, given that different answers would produce quite different consti
tutional systems. Indeed, the question was taken up in several early constitutions,
Pennsylvania's, Vermont's, and New York's among them. But there is not the
slightest hint in any of these constitutions that the people wished the judges,
sitting as judges, to enforce their constitutions for them (or on many occasions
against them), and many indications they assumed that they themselves would
enforce their constitutions, primarily through the mechanism of frequent
(annual) elections. In taking it upon themselves to enforce constitutions,
the judges were in effect creating a revolutionary new constitutional system.
Because many early state constitutions did not provide an amendment process,
for example, a judicial judgment striking down a law that had received
overwhelming popular support would wrest from the people the ultimate
decision about the laws by which they would be governed. Except in states in
which the elected upper house of the legislature continued to serve as part of
the highest court ofthe state, the judges rather than the people would have the
final word on the laws, unappealable even by the people themselves, except
through revolution. Leaving out this part of the story, it seems to me, is no
small matter, even in an otherwise comprehensive and magnificent volume.
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